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Abstract
The punishment of social misconduct is a powerful mechanism for stabilizing high levels of cooperation among unrelated
individuals. It is regularly assumed that humans have a universal disposition to punish social norm violators, which is
sometimes labelled ‘‘universal structure of human morality’’ or ‘‘pure aversion to social betrayal’’. Here we present evidence
that, contrary to this hypothesis, the propensity to punish a moral norm violator varies among participants with different
career trajectories. In anonymous real-life conditions, future teachers punished a talented but immoral young violinist: they
voted against her in an important music competition when they had been informed of her previous blatant misconduct
toward fellow violin students. In contrast, future police officers and high school students did not punish. This variation
among socio-professional categories indicates that the punishment of norm violators is not entirely explained by an
aversion to social betrayal. We suggest that context specificity plays an important role in normative behaviour; people seem
inclined to enforce social norms only in situations that are familiar, relevant for their social category, and possibly
strategically advantageous.
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Introduction
Social norms are key to human cooperative interactions [1,2].
When efficiently enforced by punishment, they usually help to
restrain free-riding behaviour in large groups of unrelated
individuals [2,3,4,5,6]–but see [7,8]. It is not clear however, what
factors drive people to punish norm violators. Depending on the
situation, there are various types of motivations for punishing
social norm violators, such as the drive to increase personal
reputation in a social context [9,10] or the urge to retaliate after
having been victim of anti-social behaviour [11]. One further
possible motivation that has raised much interest in the literature–
because it directly enforces social norms–is the aversion to social
betrayal [12,13,14,15]. Our study focuses on this particular type of
motivation.
Studies making use of economic games reveal a human
disposition to spend money to punish social norm violators even
while knowing that no further round of the game will be played–
therefore no long term monetary reward from future cooperation
can be expected [16,17,18]. This propensity to enforce social
norms has been observed in third-party situations where subjects
witness an interaction in which they are not personally involved,
are prompted to consider the behaviour of one actor as wrong, and
have the possibility–but no obligation–to punish the wrongdoer
[12,19]. To a lesser extent, third-party punishment can also be
observed when anonymous test conditions are secured–thus, no
gain through reputation can be expected from applying punish-
ment [10,20]_ENREF_17.
These experimental results have led some experimental
economists and evolutionary anthropologists to propose that
humans have evolved a strong and universal psychological
disposition to punish norm violators [12,13,14,15,21]_ENRE-
F_6_ENREF_7. This disposition–sometimes called ‘‘universal
structure of human morality’’ [12] or ‘‘pure aversion to social
betrayal’’ [13]–would be triggered when somebody reveals an anti-
social intention by violating a group-beneficial norm [14]. This
aversion to social betrayal is considered to be present in all
cultures, although important individual differences in its expres-
sion are acknowledged–depending on individual personality types,
this aversion can be expressed more or less vividly. Culture-specific
patterns of norm enforcement–which norm violations are likely to
be sanctioned–are attributed to cultural evolution, which shapes
the specific content of the norms that are enforced in a given
population [15,22]. Thus, this assumption of a ‘‘pure aversion to
social betrayal’’ does not imply that all humans always punish
norm violations or that humans sanction the same norm violations
in all cultures; it predicts however that a significant proportion of
any sufficiently large group of humans will punish violations of
local norms.
The occurrence and generality of such aversion to social
betrayal is an important topic because it is tightly connected with
the cross-disciplinary debate over the extent to which people are
altruistically motivated to help others or contribute to the common
good [23,24,25]. However, the scope of current results on third-
party punishment remains difficult to evaluate because they have
mainly been obtained in laboratory test conditions [26,27], with
the use of monetary games that allow for testing only specific
norms–equity and equality norms. Moreover, in these games,
participants might easily misunderstand the instructions [28] or
alter their behaviour when they are aware of being studied or
when they have taken similar tests before [29]. Finally, research in
anthropology and sociology cast doubt on the idea that, in the real
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world, people are willing to sanction others’ social norm violations
if there is no social pressure or personal interest at stake for
a review, see [27].
Interestingly this debate parallels an important and old standing
controversy among philosophers. Proponents of the ‘‘internalist’’
view contend that moral judgments are necessarily motivating
[30,31], whereas advocates of the ‘‘externalist’’ view think that the
source of motivation lies outside moral judgments–e.g. social
pressure or personal interest [32,33]. Internalists would endorse
the idea of pure aversion to social betrayal, whereas externalist
would reject it.
To challenge the idea of a universal propensity to punish social
betrayal, and to contribute experimentally to the philosophical
debate, we conducted a real-life, non-economic, third-party study
implicating different socio-professional categories. We used
a novel exploratory approach that avoids confounding factors
such as reputation, retaliation, or monetary incentive, while
testing participants who do not expect their moral behaviour to
be studied. In an everyday school context, while not knowing
that they were being studied, student-participants have been
invited to vote for young violinists in a music competition staged
on video. The participants were also informed that one of the
violinists had a reputation for moral misconduct because she had
repeatedly attempted to ruin the quality of others’ work.
Participants had no formal obligation to intervene, but they
could punish the immoral violinist by diminishing her career
opportunities. The decision to punish had no impact on
participants’ lives: the wrongdoer was not expected to be
encountered in the future, and punishment provided no
reputation because it was done anonymously. We tested
participants from the same territorial and socio-cultural area
who could agree on the violinist’s immoral character. Partici-
pants differed, however, in their career trajectories: they were
future teachers, future police officers, and high school students.
Our aim was to find out whether, and to what extent, people
are inclined to apply non-self-interested–i.e. not motivated by
expectation of future rewards such as reputation–punishment
against a moral norm violator in a real-life context. We evaluated
the universal character of people’s propensity to punish social
betrayal by examining three categories of participants with
similar cultural backgrounds. If cost-free third-party moral
punishment is not applied equally in the three categories despite
shared moral disapproval, this would cast doubt on the ‘‘pure
aversion to social betrayal’’ hypothesis, and call for further
investigations of the motivational factors responsible for moral
punishment.
Materials and Methods
Ethics Statement
This study has been approved by our local ethics committee:
‘‘Comission cantonale d’e´thique de la recherche sur l’eˆtre
humain’’, University of Lausanne. Throughout the whole test
procedure, participants were unaware of being studied, thus, they
were not asked for written informed consent. Instead, we
organised post-experimental debriefing sessions during which
we asked for verbal consent. We took note that none of the
participants expressed discomfort or asked to withdraw their data
from the study after having been informed of their involvement
in a scientific experiment. Votes and questionnaires were
completed anonymously: neither fellow participants nor experi-
menters could know individual responses. The experimenters and
the ethics committee considered the above described test
procedure as adequate because, from participants’ perspective,
the study is not more invasive than an anonymous opinion
survey.
Methods
During ordinary class lessons, we simulated the final phase of
a violin competition: representatives of a music company – in fact
experimenters – entered in student-participants’ classrooms and
asked them to act as music judges in the final phase of a violin
competition (see File S1, section 1 for detailed test procedure and
materials). Participants were students from three different types of
schools: preparatory for becoming teachers (n = 66, 3 classes from
2 different schools, age 18–35), advanced high school (n = 122, 7
classes from 2 schools, age 14–18), and preparatory for becoming
police officers (n = 109, 1 class, age 19–43).
Participants sat at a computer with headphones, heard
a professional recording of an excerpt from a Mozart Violin
Concerto, followed by filmed recordings of the two pre-selected
violinists playing the same piece. Both violinists were professional
female performers of similar appearance, whose faces could not
clearly be seen, and both were described as finishing students
from a European music school. Participants also received
additional information from short interviews of the violinists’
former music professor: the professor provided ‘‘technical
information’’–e.g. she usually is very right in her tone–and
‘‘social information’’–e.g. she has always been well integrated in
her class. Participants were told that the winning violinist would
be awarded a record deal, which represents a significant career
improvement.
By design, one violinist’s musical performance was better–
according to professional standards–than the other; we used
respectively the best and the worst version of a series of pre-
recorded performances by each musician. Control and treatment
Figure 1. Proportions of votes for the most talented violinist
among teacher, high school and police students when they
received the moral information–i.e. she is immoral–(black bars)
or when they received the neutral information–i.e. she is
socially integrated–(grey bars). Significance levels (mixed-effect
GLM): ** = p,0.01, n.s. = p.0.05.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0039002.g001
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conditions differed with respect to the social information provided
by the professor. Participants in the control condition (teacher,
n = 32; high school, n = 57; police, n = 55) received equally
positive information regarding both violinists’ social character. In
the treatment condition (teacher, n= 34; high school, n = 65;
police, n = 54), however, the less talented violinist was described in
a socially positive way, whereas the more talented violinist was
described as morally disrespectful: she showed repeated moral
misconduct such as mistuning fellow students’ instruments or
mixing their musical scores just before concerts. Also, because the
order in which information is provided can influence people’s
choices [34,35], we randomized the order in which participants
viewed violinists in both the control and treatment conditions.
After observing the musical performances and professor inter-
views, participants voted for one violinist that they considered
worthy of career advancement, followed by a short questionnaire
in which they reported their gender, age, and interest in classical
music. In most experiments (3 teacher classes, n = 66; 3 high
school classes, n = 36; the large police class, n = 109), participants
were also asked what factors played a role in their voting decision–
e.g. technical considerations, feelings, moral considerations. Post-
experimental debriefing sessions confirmed that participants
believed the cover story–except for 12 sceptical participants that
were discarded from the analysis–and were convinced that their
decisions had real repercussions.
Statistical Analysis
To test whether socio-professional categories differed in their
voting behaviour, we analysed the full dataset with a generalized
linear mixed-effects model (GLM, family = binomial) [36], in-
cluding the following fixed factors and their interactions: gender,
interest in classical music, socio-professional category (teacher,
high school and police), moral information about the most talented
violinist’s behaviour (socially integrated versus immoral), violinist
viewing order, and the residuals of age category (#18, .18)
regressed on socio-professional category–we used residuals here
because age and socio-professional category were positively
collinear (r = 0.171, p = 0.003) [37]. To account for variation
among classes–because teacher and high school categories were
composed of two schools each divided into several classes–, we
assigned class as a random effect. We sequentially simplified the
full model (significance criterion: p,0.05) by removing non-
significant effects beginning with highest-order interactions until
we obtained a final model. Because the three socio-professional
categories differed with respect to the propensity to punish, we
repeated the same procedure for each category (teacher, high
school and police) separately.
To determine if the three socio-professional categories differed
in their stated receptivity to moral information, we analysed the
written information left by participants in the treatment condition
(data from 104 participants). With a two-sided Fisher’s exact test,
we compared the number of participants from each socio-
professional category who stated that moral information–solely
or among other criteria–influenced their vote, to the number of
participants that did not mention moral information as a factor in
their decision. In a post hoc analysis, we also used a one-sided
Fisher’s exact test to determine whether participants’ stated
receptivity to moral information was correlated with the order in
which they viewed violinists.
Results
The propensity to punish social misconduct–i.e. to vote against
the immoral violinist despite the fact that she was more talented–
varied among participants with different career trajectories
(mixed-effect GLM: interactions between moral information
and socio-professional categories: high school and teacher
categories z = 2.15, p= 0.031, police and teacher categories
z = 2.12, p= 0.034; Table 1). Future teachers punished the most
talented violinist according to her past social misconduct, with
37% less votes for her when she was described as immoral
(mixed-effect GLM: z=23.10, p = 0.002; Fig. 1). In contrast,
future police officers and high school students did not show
significant third-party moral punishment, with only a 2.5%
decrease in votes in response to social misconduct, on average
(mixed-effect GLM: police students: z =20.553, p = 0.580; high
school students: z =20.802, p= 0.423; Fig. 1). Consistent with
this outcome, future teachers reported significantly more re-
ceptivity to moral information–immoral character of the violin-
ist–than did future police officers and high school students
(Fisher’s exact test: p = 0.048; Fig. 2). Specifically, 38% of the
future teachers stated that moral information influenced their
vote, in contrast to 19% and 15% of the high school and police
students, respectively. None of these participants voted for the
immoral violinist.
The viewing order affected participants’ judgment overall
(mixed-effect GLM: z=27.05, p,0.001; Table 1) and in each
category of participants (high school: z =25.06, p,0.001; police:
z =24.25, p,0.001; teacher: z =22.46, p = 0.014). In all cases,
more votes went to the violinist that was presented last (File S1,
section 2.1). Moreover, self-reported interest in classical music was
associated with a significant increase in votes for the most talented
violinist, both overall (mixed-effect GLM: z= 3.58, p,0.001;
Table 1) and in the high school category (z = 2.64, p= 0.008).
The teacher category was better at identifying the most
talented violinist (this was expected notably because preparatory
schools for teachers provide more music training than police and
high schools), which induces a difference among categories in our
control condition (Fig. 1). There is no plausible relationship
between this difference and the effect of moral information.
Figure 2. Proportion of participants exposed to moral in-
formation reporting that moral information influenced their
decision. Overall proportions differed significantly among socio-
professional categories (two-sided Fisher’s exact test: p = 0.048).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0039002.g002
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Moral information clearly influenced teachers’ decisions. Had
police and high school students been equally responsive to moral
information, they should have punished the immoral violinist
even more than teachers, as the violinist’s misbehaviour was the
only relevant discriminating information they received, given that
they were not as good at judging the music. But this was not how
the future police and high school students behaved.
Lastly, there was a correlation between acknowledged re-
ceptivity to moral information and viewing order (Fisher’s exact
test: p = 0.025). Significantly more participants who reported
being influenced by the moral information had seen the immoral
violinist first. As the viewing order biases the votes in favour of
the violinist presented last, it suggests that participants were more
receptive to moral information when it was compatible with
a choice of action–vote for the last violinist–they were already
inclined to make. The extensively studied tendency of post-hoc
rationalisation for one’s decisions can easily account for this
result [38,39] (more details in File S1, section 2.2).
Discussion
We found limited evidence for non-self-interested moral
punishment. Future teachers punished the immoral violinist
although they were not personally affected by her wrongdoing,
had no formal obligation to sanction, and could not expect
a benefit through reputation or future cooperation from punish-
ing. This propensity to punish the norm violator, however, varied
greatly among socio-professional categories. In sharp contrast
with future teachers’ behaviour, police and high school students
did not sanction the immoral violinist. This difference appears
clearly in participants’ voting decisions (Fig. 1), as well as their
expressed statements about what influenced their decisions
(Fig. 2). Note that the lack of motivation to punish is particularly
striking in light of the fact that the decision to punish did not
imply any form of cost–neither monetary nor reputational–for
the punisher.
In numerous writings, experimental economists and evolution-
ary anthropologists have taken the observation of third-party
punishment as evidence for the existence of a simple universal
punishing mechanism [12,13,14,15,21]. Our results challenge
this broad assumption in revealing behavioural variations across
different categories of participants who could all acknowledge the
obviously immoral character of the violinist–she showed basic
disrespect towards her fellow students in mistuning their
instruments or mixing their musical scores just before concerts.
Future teachers punished, but not police and high school
students. This suggests that people are not genuinely motivated
to enforce the general social norms to which they abide.
Additional conditions to the bare recognition of social mis-
conduct seem to be needed before individuals are motivated to
apply punishment.
Most variation previously observed in people’s propensity to
apply third-party punishment has been compatible with the idea of
a universal aversion to social betrayal. For example, the substantial
differences reported across societies [5,22,40] might reflect the
moral standards particular to cultures, where some cultures are
more receptive to a given norm than others [5,8,15]. Similarly, the
important differences across studies conducted in western socie-
ties–third-party punishment can vary from 10% [19,20] to 60%
[12]–could be explained by differences in experimental designs.
For example, motivation to inflict third-party punishment can be
enhanced or disrupted by subtle cues that refer to external factors
such as reputation [10,21], expectation of future cooperation [19],
or monetary incentives [41]. The variation observed in our
experiment, however, resists these explanations. Indeed, all
participants shared the same broad socio-cultural background
and were exposed to an identical test protocol in which neither
reputation nor future cooperation nor monetary gains could be
expected–because votes and questionnaires were completed
anonymously.
There is room for speculation about the reasons why only future
teachers enforced the moral norm. First, one might think that only
teachers understood the violinist’s behaviour as immoral. This
hypothesis is not very convincing though, as an important number
of participants in the police (39%) and high school (44%)
categories explicitly mentioned her misbehaviour in the question-
naire–most of them stated that they were aware of the immoral
character of the violinist but decided to discard this information.
Second, the three categories may have had a different un-
derstanding of the task that was assigned to them. However, the
comments left by participants did not reveal any marked difference
in their understanding of the task–i.e. vote anonymously for the
candidate they wanted to promote. Third, there might be selection
for certain personality types within certain career paths. For
example, individuals who are more sensitive to norm violation
may be more likely to become teachers. However, in that case,
some non-negligible proportion of punishers should also be present
in the high school category, as teachers–but not police officers–
need to complete high school before starting their preparatory
school.
Some elements relevant to understanding teachers’ behaviour
are worth emphasising. First, their social role is to educate students
and the cover story presents a teacher referring to the moral
misbehaviour of one of his music students in a school context.
Thus, this type of norm violation may be more relevant for
teachers. In contrast, the main role of police officers is to enforce
state laws, rather than socially accepted moral norms. Second, it is
strategically advantageous for teachers to be able to punish
undisciplined students so as to discourage them from disturbing
the class atmosphere in the future. These facts might indicate that
people are more inclined to enforce social norms in familiar
contexts with clear assignments of social duties, and among these
Table 1. Summary of the final generalized mixed-effects
model including participants from all three socio-professional
categories (dependent variable = vote for or against the most
talented violinist; reference category = teacher).
Factor coefficient z value p
Moral information 22.01 23.03 0.002
Violinist viewing order 22.03 27.05 , 0.001
Interest in classical music 1.33 3.58 , 0.001
Police vs. Teacher categories 20.99 21.61 0.108
High school vs. Teacher categories 21.42 22.33 0.020
Moral info * Police vs. Teacher
categories
1.69 2.12 0.034
Moral info * High school vs. Teacher
categories
1.69 2.15 0.031
The two last lines in the table report significant interactions between how
participants responded to moral information (voted for or against the immoral
versus socially integrated violinist) and which socio-professional category they
belonged to (comparing either police or high school to teacher). This indicates
that both police and high school categories differed from the teacher category
with respect to their propensity to punish. Moreover, the order in which
participants viewed the violinists, as well as participants’ stated interest in
classical music, were significant.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0039002.t001
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contexts, possibly those in which widespread obedience to the
social norm provides benefits to their social category. If the
strategic aspect plays a crucial motivational role in punishment,
externalist views of moral motivation would gain empirical
support.
Our results are consistent with psychology and economics
literature that reveal the context-sensitive aspects of human
normative behaviour [42,43]. For example, people show in-
creased norm obedience when their attention has been previously
drawn to the norm or to a closely related norm [42], or when
they expect most of their neighbours to follow the norm [43].
The idea of stable norms of cooperation has also been recently
challenged with results showing that population size affects
individuals’ propensity to cooperate [44]. More directly relevant
to third-party punishment behaviour, two economic experiments
point to the importance of the strategic aspects of normative
situations: the propensity to apply third-party punishment
declines when out-group members–as opposed to in-group
members–have been a victim of wrongdoing [45] or when
participants are informed of the presence of a second third-party
that can punish the same wrongdoer [20]._ENREF_18_ENRE-
F_18_ENREF_18_ENREF_18 Parochialism and diluted respon-
sibility are strategic factors that seem to impact directly on
people’s receptivity to social norm violation and motivation to
apply punishment.
To sum up, people turn out to be choosy with respect to the
norms they are willing to enforce in particular circumstances.
The mismatch between people’s evaluation of a norm violation
and their willingness to enforce the moral norm shows that other
causal factors than a pure aversion to social betrayal are
operating. Familiarity of the context in which the norm is
violated, and duties associated with social functions might play
a role. They are possibly coupled with sensitivity to strategic
aspects of the social context. Actors might not be consciously
aware of such sensitivity though, leaving open the question as to
what extent the resulting behaviour counts as moral. Further
studies will help identify more precisely whether, and to what
extent, these factors are needed to elicit punishment. For
example, it would be interesting to manipulate independently
the social and the strategic relevance of the norm for various
socio-professional categories.
Supporting Information
File S1 Test procedure and material and supplementa-
ry statistics.
(PDF)
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